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Italian firms are top users of trade credit in an international comparison. The paper offers some 
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main finding of the univariate analysis is that, with the almost totality of transactions made on 
credit, there is no evidence that this way of financing is more expensive than loans. An econometric 
investigation shows that discounts offered have the expected effect of reducing payment delays 
mostly for customers located abroad, where customary credit periods are shorter and creditors’ 
rights protection is more effective. The result is consistent with the poor explanatory power of 
discounts received in regressions for the trade debt period of domestic firms.  
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 1.  Introduction 
Italy, France, Greece, Portugal, Spain and, to a lesser extent, UK use trade credit 
much more than Germany, Netherlands and the U.S. (Demirgűç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 
2001). Can this pattern partially be accounted for by the price and non-price contractual 
features of trade credit, such as agreed and ex post payment delays, discounts for quick 
payments and penalties for late ones? The evidence is rather scattered and often dated, with 
the partial exceptions of Ng et al. (1999) and Danielson and Scott (2000) for the U.S. and 
of Pike and Cheng (2001) and Wilson and Summers (2002) for the UK; no study is 
available on whether the own cost of trade credit is a significant determinant of payment 
delays. An investigation into the subject, warranted on analytical grounds, is badly needed 
to evaluate whether a recently passed EC Directive
1 could be effective in reducing late 
payments. The Directive, besides strengthening and making less costly to enforce the trade 
creditors’ rights, sets a standard 30 days payment delay (60 only for some types of 
contracts) for private and public customers and a default penalty interest rate at least 7 
percentage points above the EBC interest rate for main refinancing operations.  
The contribution of this paper to the literature is twofold. 
First, it provides firm-level data on the contractual features of this financing 
instrument exploiting the answers to a questionnaire of about 1900 manufacturing firms of 
a country, Italy, at the top in the world league of trade credit use. The main finding is that, 
with the almost totality of  transactions made on credit, there is no evidence that this is 
more expensive than loans. As a consequence, the positive link between trade debt and 
credit rationing, taken for granted in most theoretical literature (e.g. Jaffee and Stiglitz, 
1990) and empirically confirmed in Petersen and Rajan (1994) for the US and subsequently 
in Harnhoff and Körting (1998) for Germany and Wilson et al. (1997) for the UK, is very 
weak, if it exists at all.  
Second, an econometric exercise investigates whether revealed discounts do 
influence credit and debt periods. Discounts offered turn out to be negatively and 
significantly correlated with actual payment delays only in export-oriented firms. When 
explaining the trade debt of domestic buyers, the discounts received show up not significant 
or even take a perverse positive sign. All in all, the finding that there is not a cost hierarchy 
  2between trade credit and loans is robust when moving from a univariate to a multivariate 
analysis. The rationale suggested is that foregoing a discount opportunity is a cheap option 
when the customary net period is sufficiently long and there are no effective penalties for 
stretching payments beyond the agreed terms, as it is the case of the Italian institutional and 
legal framework but much less so abroad. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes some stylized facts in the 
main EU countries and in the US; Section 3 provides a descriptive analysis of the trade 
credit features among Italian manufacturing firms, including an univariate investigation on 
the links with credit rationing; Section 4 offers a cross-section econometric analysis, 
centered on the role of discounts proposals in determining the actual credit and debt 
periods; Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Trade credit features: an international comparison  
A comparison, based on averaged data from a representative sample of the 
industrial sector in the harmonised account data base BACH (Bardes, 2002), shows a stable 
ranking for the ratios to total assets of trade credit and debt in the period 1989-2000, with 
Italy on top (in the last year, respectively 33 and 24 per cent), followed by France and Spain 
(25 and 23 per cent), while Germany’s indicators are the lowest (8 and 7 per cent)
2; the 
U.S. indicators are slightly above the latter ones.  
A possible explanation of the differences in credit periods between low and high 
users (and the UK as well
3) is twofold, having controlled for those factors – price 
discrimination, sales stabilization, economies of scale – suggested in the literature and that 
are not country-specific.  
First, the trade credit own cost depends on the contractual clauses – implied 
interest rates in two-part contracts allowing for discounts for quick payments
4 and penalties 
for ex post delays  – and on the extent they are enforced. Ng et al. (1999) show how, on 
average data by sectors in the U.S., even if trade debt is more expensive than short term 
loans, the actual spread cannot be easily computed, because it depends on how common is 
the two-part contract: according to the study, it is offered by only a quarter of firms, 
manufacturers and not. Among the largest EU countries, only in Germany a 2 per cent 
discount is usually granted for payments within 15 days, even though with sizable 
  3differences across sectors (Harhoff and Körting, 1998); in France this contract is far less 
widespread (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1999). An additional component of the own cost is the 
size of, and how widespread are, penalties for late payments. Wilner (2000, fn. 4) quotes a 
1996 survey showing that a majority of US companies did not implement a late payment 
penalty and that only 7% had previously charged it. Pike and Cheng (2001) report that out 
of two thirds of large UK companies surveyed incorporating within their standard credit 
conditions the right to charge interest on late payments, only 44% had ever exercised this 
right and just 3% as standard practice.  
Second, trade credit use, as a substitute to bank lending, can depend on a country’s 
legal system. Demirgűç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) detect a negative relation between 
the size of trade credit and the efficiency of a country’s legal system in enforcing contracts, 
to the extent that this benefits financial intermediaries, i.e. the natural suppliers of credit. 
The same point is made more precise in a study comparing the financial structure of French 
and German manufacturing firms. “French payment patterns are not shaped by 
reservation-of-ownership rules designed specially to safeguard the interest of creditors 
[…]. The German legal system strongly encourages the settlements of trade creditors. […]” 
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 1999, p. 36).  
These remarks on the French legal and contractual framework before the EC 
Directive apply very closely to Italy as well: its legal framework is based on the French law 
in the Laporta et al. (1998) taxonomy; among the largest EU countries, the law and order 
indicator that proxies the efficiency of legal systems ranks at the top Germany, followed by 
France, UK, Italy and Spain (Demirgűç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001, Table 1)
5. 
3.   Trade credit practices in the Italian manufacturing sector  
The 1994 edition of the triennial Mediocredito Centrale (MC) survey on more than 
5000 manufacturing firms – a representative sample for firms with 11 to 500 employees 
and all largest ones – includes, besides a short time series of annual accounts and 
information on a set of firms’ idiosyncratic characteristics, a questionnaire on trade credit 
and debt (for the wording of the main questions see Appendix).  The data-set used in the 
econometric exercise, that shrinks to a maximum of 1900 firms owing to missing or 
inconsistent data, under-reports smaller firms: the average employees in the first decile, 23, 
  4compares with 8.9 employees and self-employed per firm in the National Accounts 
manufacturing sector in 1996.  
Every question refers separately to three counterparts: firms in the same group, 
other non-group Italian and foreign firms. Interpreting the answers is not, however, 
straightforward. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE  
  
First, the answers on trade debt (the average debt period, the average delays 
beyond contractual agreements, discount proposals received for quick payments; Table 1), 
clustered around some focal points, seem to mirror what a respondent thinks to be the 
customary practice in the sector the firm belongs to, rather than the individual own 
experience.  
Second, the response rate for questions related to firms in the same group is pretty 
low. Moreover, the questionnaire does not include a grand total answer for each question. 
This is rather inconvenient, because it prevents checking for the mutual consistency of 
answers referring to items like the annual flows of trade credit and debt and for their 
compatibility with balance sheet data. 
Third, the questionnaire asks whether a discount proposal for payment one month 
earlier than agreed was made or received. Taken literally, the wording could be translated 
into a two-part contract, setting D = N - 30, N  > D. Similar credit terms are however not 
found in the literature nor in the anecdotal evidence for Italy. The answer could instead be 
framed as referring to a standard two-part contract with N = αD,  α ≥ 2, common in the 
actual practice of important commercial partners such as Germany or U.S. The implied 
interest rate in foregoing the discount would be of course very different in the two cases, 
the lower the larger the N - D period
6. An upper bound could be provided by the 
(annualized value of) penalty imposed for each month of delay beyond the agreed date. The 
result should at any rate be considered very cautiously, in the light of the dramatic drop in 
the percentage of answers to this question.  
These shortcomings notwithstanding, the answers to the questionnaire provide a 
unique snapshot of key features of trade credit, taken and granted, among Italian 
  5manufacturers. The data refer to a not so recent year, 1994, but the 2000 evidence from the 
first Bank of Italy survey on trade credit suggests that very little has changed in the 
meantime (Banca d’Italia, 2001). 
 
3.1 An exploratory data analysis of firms’ answers 
 
The descriptive analysis of the MC questionnaire is organized by firms split into 
quintiles by total assets, separately for two counterparts: Italian independent and foreign 
suppliers (Table 1). Italian suppliers belonging to the same group are not taken into account 
owing to the very low response rate.   
-        Almost one hundred per cent of purchases from Italian independent suppliers 
is made on credit; the percentage falls to about three quarters when considering foreign 
suppliers, but only because of their very limited share in the first quintile.    
-  The average debt period with Italian independent suppliers is longer by 
about ten days than with foreign ones and, on average, at least two and a half times the 
standard (one month) according to the EC Directive. In addition, debt periods for domestic 
suppliers positively correlated with firms’ size on average data, though not on median data.  
-  The proportion of suppliers offering discounts is low on average (slightly 
below 7 per cent for Italian ones and 4 for foreigners). Moreover, the option is 
acknowledged to be available to a limited subset of firms: it is in fact zero on median data.  
-  The annualized interest rate implied by the discounts offered for early 
payments is on average (using the 2.6 per cent average discount for Italian suppliers) about 
37 per cent with a fixed N - D = 30; accepting the more plausible interpretation of a 
standard two-part contract, it drops to 19 per cent with an agreed average net period N = 
84.5 and to 10 per cent with N = 125 (average net period on account data; Table 6)
7.  It is 
useful to notice that the average short term bank lending rate in 1994 was 11.2 per cent, a 
figure that sets a lower limit to the average rate for uncollateralized very short term loans, 
i.e. the closest substitute to trade credit. The Kiholm Smith (1987) hypothesis that trade 
credit terms are relatively uniform within an industry, since sellers and buyers face similar 
market conditions, while possibly showing wide variation across industries, receives 
qualified support from the data. Adopting a breakdown by Pavitt sectors, discounts offered 
  6by domestic and foreign suppliers are almost identical within and across sectors (Table 2). 
Average payment delays do show instead a comparatively reduced correlation (0.5-0.6 
instead of 0.9) between domestic and foreign suppliers.  
-  Penalties for late payments are applied pretty rarely (slightly over 3 per cent 
from Italian suppliers and less than 1 per cent from foreign ones; Table 1). The low 
incidence of acknowledged late payments is surprising, when compared with the measured 
(on account data) debt periods. On average, the proportion of ex post delays to foreign 
suppliers is a half compared to Italian ones and rises with firm size, especially with the 
latter ones. This finding, together with the similar one for the average debt periods, hints at 
some degree of market power exploitation. 
-  Penalties are imposed only after a one-month delay. The question on the 
size of the penalty per month of delay imposed by Italian suppliers receives even fewer 
answers (90; just 18 for foreign suppliers). With this caveat, the penalty rate is not so 
penalizing, being less than the discount proposal received.  
-  The discounts offered are on average smaller than the ones received and are 
correlated negatively with firm size. This latter result is surprising, because larger firms 
could be expected to be better at implementing a discount policy if this were considered an 
effective financing and marketing instrument. Some doubts about the propensity to 
differentiate discounts are indeed raised when considering non-null discounts offered to 
both domestic and foreign buyers: they are almost identical (correlation around 0.9), 
irrespective of the sizable interest rate differential between Italy and the main partners in 
1994 (Table 2). The variation across sectors is slightly higher than in the case of discounts 
received, with the traditional sector adopting a more aggressive policy.    
-  Many more firms acknowledge to offer than to receive discounts; among 
the first ones, less than a half state to offer discounts to Italian buyers and about one third to 
foreign ones.  A possible explanation of the first result could be the wider customer base – a 
mix of other firms and of wholesalers or retailers, domestic and foreign - on the credit side 
in comparison with only domestic manufacturers on the debt side. The MC dataset allows 
investigating the issue because it includes answers on sales breakdown by seven customer 
types (see Section 4). 
1.   
  7INSERT TABLE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
 
3.2 Credit rationing and trade credit 
The link, emphasized in Petersen and Rajan (1994), between smaller firms 
rationed in the bank credit market and recourse to the more expensive trade credit extended 
by larger firms
8, is not supported by the descriptive evidence in the MC dataset
9.  
Firms are asked two questions to ascertain whether they are credit rationed: first, 
have they applied for larger loans than in fact obtained; second, would they have accepted 
to pay more? A rather large set of indicators - answers to the questionnaire and economic 
and financial variables based on account data –, computed for the subsamples of firms 
acknowledging to be (about 6 per cent)
10 and not to be rationed, suggests a weak link, if it 
ever exists (Table 3). The answers are the same, almost always up to the 75
th percentile, for 
the average debt period, the proportion of suppliers offering discounts, the discount offer 
received, the average delay beyond the agreed one, the proportion of late payments, the 
penalty rate and the proportion of suppliers applying it, the discount offered; they are only 
slightly higher on average data – statistically significant only for the proportion of late 
payments - for rationed firms. The pattern is very similar also for the indicators computed 
on account data, except for ROI, significantly lower for the rationed firms. Trade debt in 
non rationed firms is one and a half times short term loans, on median data, and twice as 
much at the 75
th percentile; both indicators are larger than for rationed firms. Finally, the 
short term loans growth rate is higher, on median data and at the 75
th percentile, for 
rationed firms
11, a fact hardly interpretable as suggesting banks’ aversion to lend. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE  
4.  Econometric investigation 
Emery (1984) argueS that credit worthy and liquid firms should extend more trade 
credit, engaging in arbitrage when borrowing and lending rates provide such an 
opportunity. Besides being a financial tool, trade credit is also a marketing one: it can help 
to smooth the pattern of demand over the business cycle and to build sales, through an 
implicit price discrimination policy, because different credit periods granted to customers 
  8translate the same nominal price into a different actual one (Schwartz and Whitcomb, 1979; 
Brennan  et al. 1988). These theoretical insights underlie the specification, similar to 
Petersen and Rajan (1997), of the cross-section equations explaining trade credit offered 
and taken. Within this empirical framework I examine two main issues. 
1.  Does the discount offered is negatively correlated with the effective credit 
period, having controlled for buyers’ nationality and for the cost of bank lending - proxied 
by the implied external borrowing rate
12 -? If the actual cost differential is low and often, it 
could be argued, even negative, as seen in Section 3.1, the own price effect could be 
predicted to be low and differentiated across customers, depending on the balance between 
financial and marketing considerations. 
2.  Does the discount proposal received shows up as a determinant of the 
effective debt period? It should not, if the main contention of the paper holds, namely that 
trade debt is not significantly more expensive than loans. Financial considerations are 
indeed predominant on the debt side, because the marketing motivations of many suppliers 
cannot be caught using account data of a single buyer.  
 
4.1  Econometric strategy 
Trade credit and debt account data, with no counterparts matching, bundle demand 
and supply motivations and explanatory equations are bound to be reduced forms. 
Additional firm-level information can however help to disentangle to some extent the 
different factors. 
More precisely, considering first credit extended, besides the revealed discount 
offered (though unfortunately there is no information on whether it is accepted), the MC 
questionnaire provides data on the sales breakdown by seven types of customers and on the 
share of sales abroad. This information is potentially very useful because: 
1.  as the average debt period in most European countries
13 and in the US is 
lower than in Italy, it can be expected that the more domestic firms have to deal with 
foreign customers the shorter, ceteris paribus, will be their actual credit period; 
2.  discount policies, to speed payments, could be more effective to offset the 
reduced collateral value of products, like those sold to other manufacturers, that are likely 
to be consumed quickly, compared to final goods sold to retailers (Ng et al., 1999).  
  9On the debt side, the mingling of demand and supply factors is heightened by 
having mostly other producers as counterparts. Petersen and Rajan (1997), in a sample of 
small firms, have proposed an interesting way to try to distinguish demand and supply 
factors. Firstly, they estimate a “normal trade debt” demand equation, exploiting the 
information on the percentage of purchases bought on credit; secondly, the predicted values 
are used as regressors in an equation explaining the actual trade debt together with various 
financial and economic indicators, taken as supply factors because of their assumed 
signalling role of the buyer’s financial worthiness. This econometric strategy cannot be 
replicated with the MC dataset, because the percentage of purchases on credit is close or 
equal to one hundred; in addition, the grand total for the three types of suppliers is not 
available. An approach aimed at distinguishing normal practices from idiosyncratic aspects 
of a firm’s interaction with suppliers could however be implemented exploiting the survey-
based average debt period, taken as a trend-like value. This variable could be entered as a 
regressor in an equation explaining the effective trade debt period, besides the usual set of a 
firm financial position, which I would interpret as proxying mostly demand factors. 
Temporary deviations from the normal practice in the settlement of a buyer’s trade debt are 
allowed because no penalties are de facto imposed on late payments. Having controlled for 
the lending rate, the discount proposal received should enter negatively signed, if it is 
perceived as an effective cost element.  
 
4.2  Credit extended 
A traditional cross-section reduced form specification of an explanatory equation 
for the ratio to sales of end-year trade credit, cre, includes financial – information on bank 
lending availability and/or other elements of a bank-firm relationship - and marketing 
determinants, as well as idiosyncratic firms’ characteristics. In this specification data on 
bank relationships are missing, and this is admittedly a drawback
14; the novel feature is the 
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  10where the explanatory variables can be grouped into four categories. 
1.  Financial determinants: implied cost of external borrowing, r; discount 
offered, disc; a current profitability indicator, such as ROI. The expected signs for r and 
disc are negative: in the first case, because of the opportunity cost of borrowing from banks 
to grant payment delays
15; in the second case, because a higher discount should provide an 
incentive to debtors to pay quickly. disc is computed as a weighted average of discounts 
offered to domestic (non-group) and foreign customers, the weight being the percentage of 
sales abroad. Entering as a regressor disc leaves open the question on how to compute the 
implied interest rate of foregoing a discount; as a consequence, the estimated coefficients of 
disc and r are not directly comparable. The negative sign attached to ROI is motivated by 
the claim that extending trade credit, a dominated investment choice on financial grounds 
according to the suggested reading of the univariate evidence, is a policy that can be 
pursued by less profitable firms gambling for higher sales.  
2.  Sales promoting determinants: gross profit as a ratio to sales, margin; sales 
growth rate, g. An implicit price discrimination policy can be realized, as suggested by 
Petersen and Rajan (1997), if a seller has high margins, generating the required cash flow 
(hence positive sign for margin). Empirically, to proxy a structural feature of the firm 
policy and mitigate simultaneity issues, margin is averaged over two years. Positive and 
negative g are entered separately, as in Petersen and Rajan (1997), to pick asymmetric 
effects when trade credit is used to stabilize sales. More precisely, the prediction is that 
negative g is negatively signed and larger in absolute value.  
3.  Sales transaction technology: proportion of sales abroad, export; customer 
base composition. If shorter credit periods are the customary practice abroad, the expected 
sign for export is negative. The customer base effect is proxied entering the proportion of 
sales to seven categories of buyers: public sector, consumers, retailers, wholesalers, firms, 
sales to order and others.  
4.  Idiosyncratic characteristics: size, proxied by total assets (in logs; end 1993 
data to reduce simultaneity); Pavitt classification into 4 categories; location by 4 macro 
regions; being a member of a group. The latter feature (38 per cent of the sample) should 
enhance a firm’s credit standing and hence lower the opportunity cost of granting payment 
  11delays; it turns out that the group dummy, though positively signed, as expected, is 
however always poorly significant
16. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
 
The OLS estimates, on a sample that excludes the few firms whose unique 
customer is the public sector
17, lend overall support to the a priori predictions (Table 4)
18. 
Starting with the basic specification estimates at column (1), let us consider first the role of 
export and of the buyers’ typology. These regressors result strongly significant, as it can be 
gauged by the t-statistic for the first one and by the strong rejection of the joint zero-
restrictions on the set of regressors representing the sales breakdown. An additional 
percentage point for export implies a lower cre by more than one eighth of point. 
The marketing role for cre is buttressed under both dimensions. An additional 
percentage point of margin translates into a cre higher by almost a half as much; the 
negatively signed and highly significant coefficient for the negative g is easily rationalized 
on the grounds of preventing sales to fall below the levels already attained.  
Examining the financial determinants, both r and ROI coefficients are negative 
and highly significant: an additional percentage point implies, respectively, a lower cre by 
one seventh and two fifths of a point. The most interesting feature is however the negative 
sign and the statistical significance, marginally above the 5% confidence level, for disc.  An 
additional point in the discount offered would amount to an implied annual interest rate of 
3.9 per cent, under the assumption of the two-part formula, with N = 125 (account-based 
computation of the mean effective credit period) and D = 30: cre would thus be reduced by 
two fifths of a percentage point, not too far from the effect of  a half when considering the r 
coefficient.  
To explore more carefully the effects of the customer base composition the 
specification in column (1) is estimated for subsamples: the first two differ for the share of 
sales abroad: less than (column 2) or at least equal to (column 3) the median value of one 
third; the second two have a percent of sales to other manufacturers and to order higher 
than (column 4) and at most equal to (column 5) 70 per cent
19. The first split is motivated 
by the different legal and institutional framework for domestic and foreign customers; the 
  12second one builds on the Ng et al. (1999) conjecture that products sold to other 
manufacturers, likely to be consumed quickly, have less collateral value to suppliers.  
Comparing columns (2) and (3), a Chow test on the equality of coefficients rejects 
the null. The main differences are consistent with the a priori prediction on the two 
regressors likely to be affected by the sample split, namely export and disc: they are indeed 
poorly significant only with the domestically-focused firms. In addition, cre is more 
influenced by the price discrimination than by the sales stabilization aim in the export-
oriented firms, as it can be gauged inspecting the relative size of the coefficients for margin 
and g. Comparing columns (4) and (5), a Chow test on the equality of coefficients rejects 
again the null. disc, with the expected negative sign, is statistically significant only with 
firms that sell prevalently to other firms, thus lending support to the conjecture of reduced 
collateral value of goods sold to these customers
20.  
To summarize so far, who the buyer is and, above all, whether it is located 
domestically or abroad, and hence operates in different legal and institutional frameworks, 
do matter when trying to explain trade credit extension. More precisely, these factors more 
than offset, in the admittedly extreme case of a country, Italy, at the top in world league of 
trade credit use, the plausible argument, put forward and empirically supported, in Ng et al. 
(1999) for the U.S. and in Wilson and Summers (2002) for the U.K., of longer payment 
delays when dealing with foreign customers, who require longer inspection periods for the 
products bought. 
The discounts offered turns out to be correctly signed and significant at the 5% 
confidence level for the entire sample; the size of its effect on cre is sensible and 
comparable the impact of r, under the assumption of a two-period contract with an extended 
net period. The robustness of this result in subsamples of export-oriented firms is the 
starting point to investigate whether discount proposals received turn out to have a negative 
effect on the actual debt period, thus supporting the hypothesis of a cost hierarchy between 
trade credit taken and a cheaper bank lending. The univariate analysis on the trade debt 
features and the econometric results on the credit offered suggest that this outcome should 
not be expected when considering domestic manufacturers.  
  
  134.3  Trade credit received 
The ratio to purchases of end-year trade credit received, debt, is explained as a 
function of a set of structural determinants - the agreed average debt period
21 with the 
Italian non-group suppliers, an indicator of bargaining power and firm’s characteristics, like 
size, location, Pavitt sector and customer base composition -, of a set of cyclical indicators - 
ROI, sales negative and positive growth rates, g - and of the own, edisc, and the 
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The indicator for the bargaining power with suppliers is computed as one-year 
lagged purchases per supplier (in log) and has a priori an uncertain sign. A firm with more 
dependent suppliers (higher indicator) could set longer debt periods exploiting a 
monopsonistic power; the same indicator, however, could instead proxy a stronger 
suppliers’ leverage on the customer, with an opposite effect on debt. The expected sign is 
minus for ROI and negative g, on the grounds that a less profitable and with poor sales firm 
is likely to exploit the cheap option of delaying payments to junior creditors, as it is the 
case in Italy for suppliers compared to employees and banks
22.  
The predicted sign for r is negative, if bank lending is a substitute for trade debt. 
The expected discount, edisc, if it is perceived as an effective cost, should enter negatively 
signed. The regressor is computed as the average discount proposal received times the (very 
low; Table 1) percentage of suppliers offering it, both answers related to the Italian non-
group suppliers (the same holds for the agreed average debt period). The choice of only one 
counterpart is due to the fact that the questionnaire does not allow estimating the 
breakdown between imports and domestic purchases and that more answers refer to Italian 
suppliers (Table 1).  
The OLS estimates of the basic specification with a sample of 828 firms 
acknowledging to have received a discount offer
23 fit overall the a priori predictions, with a 
notable exception for the cost variables (Table 5, column 1)
24. First of all, the survey based 
average debt period enters very significantly. The negatively signed purchases per supplier 
suggests that the bargaining power of (large) suppliers more than offsets the buyer’s 
  14monopsonistic one. ROI and negative g enter significantly and with the expected sign, 
supporting their interpretation as demand indicators for a distressed firm. One additional 
percentage point in ROI is associated with a lower debt by about 0.18 per cent; the 
combined effect of a higher ROI on payment delays offered (Table 4) and taken is 
definitely a reduction in the net trade credit to sales ratio. Positive g enters significantly but 
it is smaller in absolute level compared to negative g.  
The most interesting findings are however the poor significance of the correctly 
signed r and, above all, the counter-intuitive positive sign attached to edisc.  
To better understand these results, as before, the same equation is run over some 
suitably defined subsamples.  
First, let us consider the dimension divide. A common finding (e.g. Davis and 
Yeomans, 1974, for the UK; Dietsch and Krémp, 1998, for France; Marotta, 1997, for Italy) 
is that larger firms exploit their market power stretching debt periods when penalties for 
late payments are not enforced, if they exist at all. Splitting the sample at the 60
th total 
assets quantile, a Chow test rejects indeed the null of equality of coefficients (columns 2 
and 3). Comparing the two columns, larger firms seems to act more on their own terms 
when determining debt, as suggested by a much larger coefficient for the agreed average 
debt period, a market power indicator coefficient reduced to almost a half and cyclical 
indicators, like ROI and positive g, poorly significant. The dimension divide shows up also 
in the coefficients of r and edisc: the first is marginally (t = 1.7) or not at all significant; the 
second one is highly significant (t = 2.8) only for larger firms, but “wrongly” signed.  
Second, let us consider only the more financially sophisticated firms, which I take 
to be those acknowledging to offer discounts (column 4). Consistently with the predictions, 
r enters highly significant and the coefficient is roughly similar to the one estimated in the 
equations for cre; even in this case, however, edisc is significant but wrongly signed. 
Third, the sample is split between firms acknowledging to/not to be late payers 
(columns 5 and 6). The Chow test rejects the null also in this case. Should the discount be 
perceived as an effective incentive to quicken payments, edisc should appear, negatively 
signed, in the equation for firms with payments on schedule. Late payers only, instead, 
show a highly significant (t = 3.2) effect of edisc, but once again with a wrong sign. 
  15All in all, I interpret the consistent pattern of the edisc coefficients as the other 
side of the coin of the poor significance found for discount offered when modelling credit 
periods for domestically oriented firms. In an institutional and legal system with a low 
enforcement of creditors’ rights and penalties for late payments rarely applied, larger and/or 
more financially expert firms are more likely to exploit their ability to get informal finance 
stretching their debt period, despite the discount proposals received. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 APPROXIMATELY HERE  
5. Concluding comments 
Investigating the case of Italy, the world top user of trade credit, provides useful 
insights to the empirical literature on the subject. Two are the main contributions of the 
paper.   
A detailed univariate analysis illustrates a set of contractual features, exploiting 
the answers of about 1900 manufacturing firms. The most interesting information, to the 
best of my knowledge as yet missing in the literature, refers to the discount proposals 
received and offered, to the penalties for late payments and to the average customary debt 
period, separately for domestic and foreign customers. I find that there is no evidence of 
trade credit being more expensive than loans; this result is borne out also when comparing 
self-defined rationed and non-rationed firms.  In addition, whereas discount proposals are 
almost identical for domestic and foreign counterparts, debt periods are significantly lower 
for the latter. These findings provide qualified support to the hypothesis that trade credit 
terms are rather uniform within an industry and possibly vary only across industries. They 
provide evidence against the hypothesis of longer payment delays when dealing with 
foreign customers, who would require longer inspection periods for the products bought.  
An econometric investigation on the determinants of trade credit shows that 
discounts offered have a minor role compared to customary credit periods; they have indeed 
the expected effect of speeding payments especially of foreign customers. The result is 
consistent with the poor significance or, if significant, with the wrong sign of the discount 
proposals received in equations explaining the trade debt period for domestic firms. These 
findings support the gist of Demirgűç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001), namely that whether 
  16customers and suppliers operate in the same legal and institutional system does matter 
when explaining trade credit use across countries. Larger debtors turn out to be able to 
exploit their market power through longer payment delays.  
The policy implication I draw from these findings is that the key feature of the EC 
Directive is the standard 30 days credit period, with enhanced and less transactionally 
expensive creditors’ rights protection. The legislated minimum penalty interest rate is not 
easy to be made effective, because of the fear of damaging customer relationships, as 
witnessed by the experiences with the 1998 UK and Italian laws (for the UK, see Bank of 
England 2002) and by the scattered evidence on how rare penalties, at any rate hardly 
enforced in customary practices. The implementation of a standard credit period, for private 
and public sector customers, much shorter than what is now common in Italy and in other 
Mediterranean countries, could instead be more successful, because of the convergence 
process towards the quick payers’ practices set in motion by the increase in cross-borders 
transactions in the EU single market. 
 
  17Appendix. The data 
Trade debt and credit questionnaire 
1.  What is the average period for commercial debt in 1994? 
2.  How many suppliers (per cent) that offered in 1994 payment delays 
proposed also a discount for quicker payments? 
3.  What is the average monthly discount for quicker payments, i.e. the percent 
price reduction a firm can obtain on average anticipating the payment by one month (e.g. 
cash instead of paying thirty days later)? 
4.  In 1994, what percentage of trade debt was paid by the firm beyond the 
agreed date and what was the average extra delay? 
5.  During 1994, what percentage of commercial debt, paid beyond the agreed 
date, implied a penalty? 
6.  What is the average penalty imposed by suppliers, as a percentage of price, 
for each month of delay? 
7.  What is the average monthly discount for quicker payments, i.e. the per 
cent price reduction the firm offers to its buyers if they pay one month earlier than agreed 
(e.g. cash instead of paying thirty days later)? 
The dataset used  
The information processed refers to a maximum of 1900 firms. Firms were 
selected if the 1994 accounts information were consistent and plausible (e.g. non-negative 
depreciation charges): violating this minimal criterion was considered to cast doubts on any 
other information collected on the firm. Variables, computed on account data, with extreme 
values were recoded to the 99° percentile. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
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1 EC Official Journal dated 8/8/2000, L.200/35.  
2 Of course, the usual caveat on international comparisons of account data applies. In 
Germany, for instance, trade credit and debt are net of the items with other firms belonging 
to the same group. 
3 Data on UK manufacturing firms referring to early nineties show that on average less than 
50% of invoices were paid in time; small firms, in the manufacturing and in the services 
sectors, suffered disproportionately from payment delays (Bank of England, 2000). 
4 A two-part contract, d/D, n/N, offers the choice of either a per cent discount d if the 
payment is done within D days, or a net period, n, with a full payment N days after the 
invoice date, with N usually two to three times D. The implied annual opportunity cost, 
should the buyer decide to forgo the discount in exchange for N-D additional days of 
financing, can be computed as  ( ) [ ]
( ) .  d /
D N 1 100 100
360 − −
−
5 The indicator is scored 0-6; Germany’s is 5.75, France 5.50, UK 5.31, Italy 5, Spain 4.98.  
6 Wilner (2000) calculates that in the US case delayed payments, when terms of sale do not 
include an explicit penalty, reduce the theoretical implied interest rate by two-fifths.  
7 Computed as days of credit(debt) = [end of year trade credit(debt)/sales(purchases)]*360 
days.   
8 Caution about the Petersen-Rajan result even for the US is suggested by Ng et al. (1999, 
Table III). The answers distribution of respondents offering two-part contracts, when asked 
whether taking trade credit suggests that the customer cannot obtain financing elsewhere, is 
the following: never (49,4%), occasionally (40.3), half of the time (3.4), frequently (5.6), 
always (1.3).    
9 A binary dummy variable for being/not being rationed turned out always poorly 
significant in the regressions illustrated in Section 4. 
10 The answers to the two questions produce an almost identical self-selected subsample.   
11 The same results hold inspecting the first decile, which could include the riskiest 
borrowers: the growth rates are in both cases negative, but less so for rationed than for non-
rationed firms (-48.7 and –59.4 per cent, respectively).   22
                                                                                                                                                                  
12 The approximation is acceptable because debt financing includes almost exclusively 
loans, mostly short term.  
13 The EU area accounts for about two thirds of exports.  
14 The data in the Credit Register managed by the Bank of Italy are not publicly available.   
15 Trade credit could be complementary if is efficient to have large non-financial firms 
partially take on the role of financial intermediaries, because they can exploit monitoring or 
contract enforcing advantages over banks.   
16 Firm’s age, a widely used regressor, was excluded because of its even poorest 
significance.   
17 Exceedingly long payment delays are a widespread practice in the public sector  (see 
Marotta, 1995). In the MC database, the 21 firms selling exclusively to the public sector 
have an actual average credit period of 183 days.   
18 The estimates are obtained with the package SPSS. The equation in column (6), including 
as a highly significant regressor also the trade debt to purchases ratio, confirms the 
robustness of the estimates in column  (1). Of course, an economic interpretation of such an 
equation would be debatable, because of the two-way causation between trade credit and 
debt.      
19 Results are robust varying the limit from a half to two thirds.  
20 Does their nationality matter? A further split among the firms in column (4) according to 
the criterion of exported sales larger or smaller that one third shows that disc is significant 
(at the 5% confidence level) only in the 390 more export-oriented firms (results available 
on request). 
21 The questionnaire answers are entered as regressors inverting the formula in fn. 7.  
22 It could be argued however that the same sign could be motivated if suppliers, in order to 
keep a customer, would be willing to let the debtor to stretch payment terms when facing 
transitory difficulties.  
23 The main results do not change when considering also firms answering they have 
received no discount proposals.    23
                                                                                                                                                                  
24 Column 7 reports the regression with the added explanatory variable cre. As explained in 
fn. 18, it must be interpreted only as a check of robustness of the estimated equation in 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Italian Foreign Italian Foreign Italian Foreign
no of firms 
correlation
average 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.4 78 72
median 3322 8 0 7 5
no of firms 
correlation
average 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.2 87 76
median 2222 9 0 8 0
no of firms 
correlation
average 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.0 92 76
median 2222 9 0 8 0
no of firms 
correlation
average 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.9 85 74
median 2 2 2 1.7 90 75
Source: see Table 1. *** statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. 
Manufacturing firms' non-null answers to selected questions 
Traditional sector
discount offered (%) discount received 
(%)
average debt period 
(days)

























no of firms average median 3




average debt period (days) 116 86.6 90 90 1594 84.30 90 90
suppliers offering discount (%) 116 8.4 0 5 1585 6.59 0 5
discount proposal received (%) 40 2.7 3 3 520 2.6 2 3
late payments (% of trade debt) 115 13.8 0 12 1590 6.8 0 0
average delay in late payments (days) 42 30.3 30 33.7 366 26.7 30 30
suppliers imposing penalty (%) 41 1.7 0 0 370 2.2 0 0
penalty per month (%)  10 2.1 1.5 3.2 66 2.1 1.5 2
discount proposal offered (%) 115 1.6 1 3 1584 1.3 1 3
share of sales abroad (%) 116 38.7 35 61.7 1600 40.1 36.5 65
from 1994 accounts
trade credit/sales (%) 116 33.2 35.1 43.5 1603 34.6 33.5 41.9
trade debt/purchases (%) 116 37.3 35.7 42.7 1603 35.5 34.3 41.2
debt/total assets (% points) 116 25.9 26.9 37.4 1603 25.6 24.8 36.7
trade debt/s.t. loans  114 4.1 1.4 2.5 1535 25.5 1.6 3.3
s.t. loans annual growth (%) 111 39.0 8.3 42.3 1533 154.0 3.7 40.5
implicit borrowing cost (%)
3 116 21.2 17.5 22.7 1603 20.3 15.4 22.0
ROI (% points) 116 1.7 1.0 4.1 1603 3.8 2.3 6.7
sales growth rate (%) 116 16.0 11.6 28.6 1603 13.8 13.8 25.5
employees (average) 116 255 100 223 1601 202 106 203
rationed
1 non-rationed
Indicators for rationed and non-rationed manufacturing firms
Source: see Table 1.
1Firms are rationed if answered yes to question 2 on credit rationing (see text) . Maximum 1994 sales for rationed
firms sets as upper limit for non-rationed ones.
2Italian non group counterparties.
3Computed as ratio of financial charges to the average
stock of loans and bonds.Table 4
implied borrowing cost (%) -0.132 -0.153 -0.093 -0.113 -0.143 -0.138
(6.57) (5.24) (3.36) (4.06) (4.97) (7.15)
early payment weighted average discount (%) -0.458 -0.290 -0.547 -0.723 -0.223 -0.369
(2.19) (0.90) (1.99) (2.10) (0.85) (1.84)
ROI  (%) -0.412 -0.335 -0.514 -0.366 -0.431 -0.303
(7.49) (3.91) (7.09) (3.93) (6.26) (5.61)
profits to sales ratio (two years average;  %) 0.479 0.400 0.611 0.292 0.569 0.266
(4.32) (2.36) (4.20) (1.52) (4.17) (2.48)
sales growth if positive, zero otherwise (%) 0.006 0.038 0.003 0.003 0.041 0.003
(0.91) (1.51) (0.53) (0.41) (1.76) (.50)
sales growth  if non-positive, zero otherwise (%) -0.240 -0.276 -0.227 -0.117 -0.317 -0.161
(5.60) (3.91) (4.26) (1.540) (5.88) (3.93)
export to sales ratio (%) -0.125 -0.052 -0.140 -0.173 -0.089 -0.125
(10.76) (1.03) (6.01) (9.69) (5.69) (11.13)
size: log (end-1993 assets) 1.133 1.046 1.565 0.974 1.420 1.307
(4.21) (2.58) (4.32) (2.28) (4.04) (5.08)
trade debt to purchases ratio (%) 0.289
(13.63)
no of observations 1889 903 986 767 1122 1889
mean of dependent variable 34.69 37.92 32.13 35.60 34.08 34.90
adjusted R
2  0.21 0.18 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.28
Test on joint zero restrictions for buyers' breakdown F(6,1867)=7.53***
Chow test on equality of coefficients
*** statistically significant at the 1% confidence level.
###############################################################################################################
Firms answering whether they have received a discount proposal from Italian independent and foreign counterparties, except for firms with
the public sector as a unique customer. OLS; t-statistics in brackets; coefficients of constant, sales breakdown by customers and dummies
for group, Pavitt sectors and location  regressors are not reported
(6)
F(21,1867)=1.98*** F(21,1867)=2.35***
Dependent variable: trade credit as a per cent ratio of sales (cre)
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)Table 5
implied borrowing cost (%) 0.048 0.070 0.056 0.111 .. 0.094 0.084
(1.50) (1.69) (1.11) (2.52) (1.73) (2.68)
expected early payment discount (%)
2 1.237 0.610 2.915 1.852 0.373 3.411 1.111
(2.33) (0.97) (2.79) (2.27) (0.61) (3.22) (2.16)
ROI  (%) -0.185 -0.187 -0.103 -0.091 -0.083 -0.452 -0.132
(2.75) (2.12) (0.97) (1.11) (1.08) (3.18) (2.01)
agreed average debt period (%)
3 0.555 0.440 0.770 0.606 0.609 0.391 0.509
(6.54) (3.92) (5.94). (5.42) (6.10) (2.43) (6.19)
purchases per supplier (log; 1993 purchases) -2.066 -2.612 -1.205 -1.820 -1.572 -2.126 -1.846
(4.09) (3.61) (1.74) (2.82) (2.65) (2.21) (3.77)
sales growth if positive, zero otherwise (%) 0.048 0.077 0.027 0.054 0.027 0.070 0.050
(1.80) (1.97) (0.77) (1.33) (0.86) (1.41) (1.94)
sales growth  if non-positive, zero otherwise (%) -0.379 -0.348 -0.506 -0.370 -0.297 -0.413 -0.304
(5.99) (4.59) (4.00) (4.32) (3.73) (3.87) (4.90)
size:log (end-1993 assets) 0,803 2.890 0.287 -0.064 0.612 0.398 0.161
(1.64) (2.98) (0.29) (0.10) (1.02) (0.45) (0.335)
trade credit to sales ratio (%) 0.256
(7.54)
no of observations 828 496 332 420 568 258 828
mean of dependent variable 35.91 36.66 34.80 34.67 34.09 39.92 35.91
adjusted R
2  0.21 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.17 0.29 0.26
Chow test on the equality of coefficients
*** statistically significant at the 1% confidence level.
Columns (2) and (3): firms below and above the 60
th total assets quantile; column (4): firms offering discounts; columns (5) and (6): firms
without/with acknowledged late payments. In italics, regressors computed from the questionnaire
(2)   (5)                 (6)         
F(20,788)=2.40*** F(20,788)=1.94***
Dependent variable: trade debt as a per cent ratio of purchases (debt)
Firms acknowledging discount proposals from Italian independent suppliers. OLS; t-statistics in brackets; coefficients of constant, sales 
breakdown by customers and dummies for Pavitt sectors and location  regressors are not reported
Regressors (1) (7) (3)      (4)         Table 6
average median 99
th percentile std. dev. average median 99
th percentile std. dev.
Regressors
trade credit to sales ratio (%) 34.89 33.60 84.47, 15.10
trade debt to purchases ratio (%) 35.85 33.97 99.29 16.96
log (end-1993 assets) 10.03 9.94 13.96 15.11 9.86 9.82 13.40 1.36
r (%) 20.55 15.65 88.49 15.64 21.07 15.67 100.42 16.96
disc (%) 1.22 0.75 5.0 1.51
edisc (%) 0.65 0.20 5.0 1.08
ROI (%) 3.43 2.06 26.83 7.57 3.24 1.90 31.84 8.19
profits to sales (%) 5.46 5.07 17.14 3.71
sales abroad  (%) 39.23 35.00 97.0 27.77
average debt period 22.50 25 41.47 6.45
1993 purchases per supplier 3.57 3.47 7.50 1.44
sales breakdown (%):
consumers 0.86 0 30 7.36 1.62 0 66.30 9.84
retailers 14.66 0 100 14.66 16.29 0 100 31.30
firms 41.34 20 100 44.47 38.56 10 100 31.30
public sector 3.09 0 80 13.36 4.58 0 100 16.88
wholesalers 23.12 0 100 34.25 23.30 0 100 34.24
sales to order 5.77 0 100 20.65 7.48 0 100 23.82













Trade credit: total sample of 1889 firms Trade debt: total sample of 828 firms
Source: own calculations from Mediocredito Centrale (1997). In italics, questionnaire answers.